Ukraine
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@Kiwiwomble said in Ukraine:
@nostrildamus said in Ukraine:
@Kiwiwomble said in Ukraine:
I was listening to a podcast not long after the invasion started, was surprised to hear, "official" polls with the 80-100% approval ratings are obviously run by state organisations...BUT...even anonymous polling in russia undertaken by foreign organisations suggested something like 60% still support putin...love him...the podcast wet on to interview a family in russia, "liberal" from their standards, had done a student exchange back in the 90's with an american family, the exchange student had gone on to become the reporter...they raved about how he would save russia and how life was better than it had ever been.
dont get me wrong, they might have fallen for the propaganda and they might have changed their minds over the last few months...but i dont think its a case of a silent majority that want him gone
isn't there a big regional factor? that many soldiers were from remote not major city areas so their families may be far less. Putin-friendly than the big cities but this hasty mobilization effort may be changing this?
honestly i have no idea but that would make some sense i guess
I read that somewhere, can find if needed.
Not sure anyone has a good grasp on Putin's popularity especially given some very rich people have had accidents with surprisingly fragile windows lately.But also seems to me a lot depends on these recent Russian additions, if Putin's popularity is based on his strength and conviction (and "truthiness") but the new annexed areas fall like dominoes then his alpha male warrior cult profile might take a considerable hit...
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@nostrildamus it has also shifted from fighting (special operation) the 'Nazi Ukrainians' to fighting the proxy war against the West. Will the Russian people accept and believe the pivot? either way a big number seem to understand it isn't going well and are getting out of dodge, but I guess you could support the war but just not want to be involved in it...
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Can't remember if I posted this already, but it paints a picture of the Russian population that makes sense to me
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Russia’s elites are split over Vladimir Putin’s uncertain future
For 21 years, Putin was a highly convenient political leader for Russia’s ruling elites, preserving the status quo. But suddenly, he’s turned into a destroyer.
Tatiana Stanovaya
Sep 21, 2022 – 5.00amUkraine’s successful counterattack means that for the first time in Russian President Vladimir Putin’s 22 years in power, he has to deal with elites who disagree with him – on strategic decisions over Russia’s war in Ukraine and how the war may end.
Having launched the war not just without any internal discussions, but without even informing key players, Putin has taken huge risks politically. If the war were going well, that gamble would have paid off, but today, as Ukraine is counterattacking and Russia is retreating, questions about Putin’s decisions are mounting.
Support for Putin is wavering within the Russian elite amid questions over his handling of the war in Ukraine. AP
There are fears that Russia may lose outright. If the president fails to convince the elites that he remains a strong leader with a clear understanding of where he is taking the country, uncertainty may become a significant political risk to Putin’s regime.
It’s true that a portion of the Russian elites – the most powerful, ambitious, and dominating players – consider the war a disaster. But virtually everyone in the elite not only empathises with Putin’s political motives but also shares his understanding of the situation and motives in launching the war.
The political mainstream remains significantly anti-Western and anti-liberal, does not consider Ukraine a full-fledged state, and dreams of shaking up the world order as revenge for 30 years of Western arrogance.
Many believe that Russia was left with no other option but to do something disastrous that would destroy the current order and provide an opportunity to rebuild it in more historically just circumstances. To put this viewpoint simply: The war may be a disaster, but it is a justifiable and understandable one.
Consequently, in the first few weeks of the war in February and March, the elites consolidated around Putin. Even those who could be considered in-system liberals or technocrats – those who viewed Putin’s actions with dread and despair – displayed submission. Many put the blame for this geopolitical nightmare not on Putin but on the West.
Russia can’t lose. Or can it?
In the first stages, until April, many hoped that the war would end quickly – in, of course, a Russian victory, whether a peace deal with Ukraine or Ukraine’s outright defeat. Russia’s inevitable victory was questioned only in terms of its cost and duration. By the end of the northern hemisphere spring, the understanding that the conflict could drag on for years had become conventional wisdom: Russia can’t lose, simply because Ukraine can’t win.Or can it? A lot changed in September.
Ukraine’s unexpectedly successful counterattack, its first since the beginning of the war, has sparked serious concerns and fears among Russian elites. Namely, what if Russia can, in fact, lose? Importantly, these doubts are focused not so much on the capability of the Russian army or its military might (although that is also cause for concern), but, more importantly, on Putin and his ability to control the situation.
Concerns started to accumulate, with a growing number of questions going unanswered. Is Russia going to annex the occupied territory? Will it hold referendums on these areas becoming part of Russia, and if so, when? Which Ukrainian regions will it take? Is it capable of retaining them? Where will Moscow find personnel to serve in the public administrations? Will the Kremlin announce an official military mobilisation?
To this day, the questions keep coming, yet Putin has been silent. All he has said is that everything is going according to plan and “all the goals of the special operation will be achieved”; those were the only answers the elite apparently deserved to hear.
The Russian informational space, from opposition media to in–system outlets, has been awash with rumours, leaks, and assumptions apparently coming from the Kremlin. But nothing sounds convincing, and nothing has come true.
Putin, right, at the Shanghai Cooperation summit in Uzbekistan last week with from left: Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev. AP
Putin’s unwillingness to explain himself, to reveal practical plans and intentions, or to address concerns and fears is one of the main reasons that his leadership is being eroded. It’s one thing to put your fate in the hands of a political leader who is a proven strongman with the capacity to stand firm in the face of geopolitical challenges. It’s another thing entirely to find yourself completely dependent on a political leader who seems to be losing yet remains stubbornly reluctant to explain anything.
Putin failed to hold his annual address to the Federal Assembly, a joint meeting of both chambers of parliament, in the spring; postponed indefinitely his Direct Line (a Q&A show with ordinary Russians planned to be held over the summer); and dodges most subjects concerning the situation on the front. He started this war alone, and he is waging it alone, leaving the elites with no choice but to blindly follow and trust his shadow deliberations with a handful of nonpublic figures as isolated as the president himself.
Over the course of September, the long–running question of “How are we going to win this war?” became “How are we going to avoid losing this war?” The problem is that Putin’s initial concept – winning the war by militarily exhausting Ukraine, slowly biting off chunks of its territory, bombarding the rest of its territory, and just waiting until it gave up – stopped being remotely convincing when Ukraine launched its counterattack.
Putin has made just two public comments on the subject of a counterattack so far. In July, commenting on a possible Ukrainian counterattack, Putin said: “Let them try ... Everyone should know that, by and large, we have not started anything in earnest yet.”
And last week, he said that Russia’s “restrained response” to Ukrainian “terrorist attacks” would not last forever, adding: “Recently, Russian Armed Forces delivered a couple of sensitive blows to that area. Let’s call them warning shots. If the situation continues like that, our response will be more impactful.”
The nuclear option
These interventions shed no light on how Russia intends to avoid losing the war. Many now speculate that Russia may have only two options: a nuclear threat (to the West, or tactical use in Ukraine) or a general military mobilisation. The latter remains highly unlikely, while the former would spell world disaster.It would be wrong to assume that the ostensible Russian leadership knows about Putin’s plans and intentions. Anyone citing insiders or Kremlin leaks overlooks that these perspectives do not reflect Putin’s real views, only the suggestions of those who may be working around him. These insiders may only guess, divine, interpret, or rely on obsolete instructions.
A striking example is the Kremlin’s apparent preparations to hold referendums in occupied Ukraine. Summarising media leaks and talks with my own sources, it appears that at the end of August, the presidential administration was working on the basis of June assumptions that by September, Russia would have secured its control over major parts of the Luhansk and Donetsk regions – those that the Kremlin had recognised as independent entities on the eve of its invasion – and would therefore hold votes there.
In the first few days of September, it became painfully obvious that the political agenda was at odds with the military situation on the ground, and that the military agenda was significantly behind. All plans were paused at the last moment, several days before the envisaged referendum date (September 11).
The power vertical fails to act consistently: While domestic policy overseers, who are responsible for referendums, are ready to launch preparations for the votes, military divisions struggle to secure physical control over the territories, and the front line is moving. The FSB agency objected to the referendums over security concerns. Every official body has its own agenda and political priorities, which often contradict the goals of others or the overall goals of the military operation. Putin appears to be failing to bring it all together.
The military setbacks and ensuing uncertainty and fears that Russia may lose the war have also aggravated internal splits. The current challenging situation on the front has deepened the schism between two large groups: The first can be summarised as “let Putin do what he considers necessary,” and the second one as “it’s time to do something, since the Kremlin is failing to react appropriately”.
The first group consists of technocrats and senior officials in the presidential administration, the cabinet, and the central bank: They are all trying to focus on their supposedly peaceful agendas and can only watch the development of the military situation without being able to impact it.
Some seek political dividends (such as First Deputy Chief of Staff Sergey Kiriyenko), some (including Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin and central bank head Elvira Nabiullina) focus on their direct duties, ignoring the war atrocities. They are passive and diligent.
The second group, which may be frustrated into action, is much more visible and vociferous. It is made up of very different players, including those who are directly involved in military affairs (such as the armed forces, security services, national guard, Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov’s forces, and billionaire Yevgeny Prigozhin’s mercenaries), and the United Russia ruling party, the in-system opposition (Communists, Liberal Democrats, and A Just Russia-For Truth), and various public figures from the dominant conservative camp.
Uncertain future
All of them are either begging Putin to inflict a crushing defeat on the Ukrainian army as soon as possible or are preparing to act on their own initiative, such as the Chechen leader Kadyrov, who has called for self–mobilisation, or billionaire Prigozhin, who is recruiting prisoners to go and fight. This part of the elite is eager to propose their own political agendas to fill the vacuum that Putin is leaving on how Russia can win the war.Meanwhile, the setbacks caused an outcry among pro-war activists and bloggers. When Russia lost control over an important part of the Kharkiv region, social networks exploded with anguished cries that “Russia is losing,” “it’s a disaster,” and “where is Putin?” – as well as calls to investigate Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu and the General Staff for treason, and for an urgent full mobilisation.
This camp is strategically loyal and ideologically close to the authorities, and it does not have a significant political impact on the opinions of the populace. It has no structure or political organisation and appears to be harmless for the Kremlin. But in the current situation, this group has become extremely dangerous, as it may shape the mood among the elites, spread awareness about the reality of the situation, and fuel fears that Russia may lose. Panic can be highly contagious.
For 21 years, Putin was a highly convenient political leader for Russia’s ruling elites: His popularity guaranteed political stability and predictability, while his reluctance to carry out any reforms ensured the conservation of the status quo.
While his high approval rating still safeguards against political destabilisation from ordinary Russians, he has suddenly been transformed into a destroyer: a leader of a country with a very uncertain future.
But make no mistake. It’s not anti–Putin sentiment that has been rising. The current political demand is for a decisive, bold, well–informed, and competent strongman – and for Putin these latter two attributes are currently in doubt.
They want a leader who can guide, confront challenges, mobilise when needed, and give hope of a better future. The elites want the old Putin to return to his duties as a full-fledged political leader, connected to reality and his surroundings, but they don’t know if he still even exists.
There is no risk of an anti-Putin takeover, since there is still no alternative to him, and the elites remain hampered by their fear of the secret services and Putin’s omnipotence.
But growing uncertainty, nervousness, and fears that Russia could lose the war will push the elites to act more independently and more boldly against their enemies. Putin’s politically fading star is the biggest threat to the regime – much more dangerous than any possible opposition or mass protests.
Tatiana Stanovaya is a non-resident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the founder and CEO of political analysis firm R.Politik
— Foreign Policy
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@taniwharugby said in Ukraine:
surely only way things are resolved without further escalation is someone close to Putin taking power from him? Walk back claiming it was all on Putin?
The tough thing is they have lost what close to 100,000 soldiers, shitloads of military equipment etc. Russia also believe they have annexed that land and therefore is now part of Russia. It would take a leader with some balls to say that was all in vain and a mistake and give Russian land back and make peace with the west. My fear is that a military defeat maybe the only way this ends.
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@Victor-Meldrew said in Ukraine:
Personally, I thunk Putin knows if he goes nuclear, he'll probably turn any friends he might have against him so will desist.
Those that are still alive after nuclear war breaks out.
It won't be a nuclear war and Putin isn't stupid enough to attack any NATO country. If he does go nuclear, I think it will likely be a small scale, low-yield attack simply to show he's prepared to use them and push the West & Ukraine into talks.
And I'm not convinced the West will want to negotiate as they see huge danger in allowing Putin/Russia get any advantage from his actions. They'll likely up the ante in a non-nuclear way - no-fly zones, massive increase in arms to Ukraine etc.
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Article in a similar vein to the one @voodoo posted:
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I can't remember where but I have read plenty that supports the notion that Putin is genuinely popular at home. Living standards for the average Russian have undoubtedly improved dramatically since he came to power. It's just that they haven't improved as much or as fast as even other ex communist Eastern European nations. However Ivan Average doesn't realise that he simply sees no more queues for everything and near famine conditions and thanks Putin for delivering 'the good times'.
Add toi this the embarrassment of teh Yeltsin years with Russia losing its empire and going from a super-poer wo a joke in a decade or so and you can see howa strong, no nonsense leader would be attractive to a majority. Sure he might broook no dissent and his human rights record... but that's been the norm in Russia since - forever.
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Anyone else still following this? I read daily kos every day, find the updates very interesting. It seems to be turning into a rout. Ukraine appear organised motivated disciplined well-informed increasingly well armed. Russia are a rabble. Ukraine currently have no reason to negotiate, quite the opposite. It might get trickier if they reach the 2014 boundaries as those parts are more well fortified. But they have more accurate artillery with longer ranges. This war will change the geopolitical landscape of Europe the likes of which we haven’t seen since Berlin Wall went down. Russia is a spent force - if you’re relying on Iran for drones and North Korea for support you’re in deep shit.
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@Billy-Tell Ukraine hacked and landed a Iranian drone recently. I think Iranian tech is based on a US drone they captured a few years back, but that's another win.
Given how Ukraine have approached their psy-ops I'm thinking they are well geared up to push hard through winter, where a lot of the messaging is winter will see both sides consolidating. If Ukraine can keep pushing why would they stop... tactical nukes aside. -
Article from the Oz today
Paranoid, deluded Putin on the brink of nuclear horror
The Russian President would probably use a nuclear weapon rather than endure total defeat in Ukraine, especially if he thinks defeat means the end of his rule.By GREG SHERIDAN
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s ultra-nationalist Russian ideology gives him an excuse for territorial aggression, but he also believes it.
Vladimir Putin would probably use a nuclear weapon, as he’s threatened, rather than endure total defeat in Ukraine, especially if he thinks defeat means the end of his rule, and possibly threatens his own physical security.
One 2014 Putin interaction with then prime minister Tony Abbott demonstrates his paranoid personality and deluded ideology. At the APEC leaders’ meeting in Beijing, Abbott told Putin they need to talk about the downing of Malaysia Airlines MH17. They went outside during morning tea. Abbott told Putin he didn’t believe the Russian had personally authorised the missile shooting but the missile and its launcher had come into Ukraine from Russia for use by pro-Russian separatists.
This could only happen with the Russian government’s broad agreement, which means Putin’s agreement. So Abbott told Putin he should apologise to the grieving families and pay them reparations.
Putin reacted with hostility. He raved about Ukrainians being nazis and that they had no right to exist as a nation because they were really part of Russia. The conversation was intense but civil and occurred through an interpreter, even though Putin speaks English.
As they walked back to the meeting, Putin, highly agitated, grabbed Abbott by his suit lapels, dragged him in close and said, furiously, in English: “You are not a native Australian. I am a native Russian!”
This is Putin’s “blood and soil” doctrine of Russian nationhood. Putin’s ultra-nationalist Russian ideology gives him an excuse for territorial aggression, but he also believes it. This makes it even more likely that he can’t bear explicit defeat.
Putin, like many dictators, is alert to how he looks. He’s just annexed 15 per cent of Ukraine’s territory and already Ukraine’s military has taken back a significant chunk of this territory.
Russia’s nuclear doctrine proclaims Moscow can use nuclear weapons to repel conventional military attacks on its territory. The annexation theoretically, absurdly, means Ukraine is now attacking Russian territory.
Putin’s nuclear threats so far have constrained NATO support for Ukraine. But recently the US and allies have given more and better weapons to Kyiv.
There must now be a chance the Russian military simply breaks in the field. The poorly trained Russian troops have no motivation, no plausible purpose for being in Ukraine and limited chances of clear success.
An army that is competent, and apparently brave enough to keep fighting one week, can, the next week, suddenly lose its nerve. It was to prevent this that Putin called up 300,000 reservists, to convince his soldiers reinforcements are on their way.
Putin could see tactical nuclear weapons as one of the only ways he can change the dynamics on the battlefield.
Russia has 1500 strategic nuclear warheads deployed, 3000 more in reserve, and has kept 2000 tactical nuclear weapons.
Using a strategic weapon is unthinkable, even for the Russians. Using a tactical weapon should be too. Some tactical nuclear weapons are still horrifically large, similar to the bomb that destroyed Hiroshima.
But others are extremely small, comparable to the largest conventional weapons. It’s not clear they would transform the battlefield. Ukraine’s forces are dispersed. But they could have a massive psycho-military effect.
They might cause Putin’s few important friends, especially China and India, to abandon him. They could also cause nervous West Europeans to push for a “dirty deal”, whereby Putin keeps a chunk of captured Ukrainian territory.
The US has far fewer tactical nukes, but any NATO response would surely be conventional.
It’s still likely nuclear weapons won’t be used, but it’s now more possible than ever in this grisly and dangerous conflict.
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A very low (around 0%) chance of this being done. Musk must know this so wonder what's he's doing??
Musk also crossed red lines for Ukraine and its supporters by suggesting that four regions Russia is moving to annex following Kremlin-orchestrated “referendums” denounced by the West as a sham should hold repeat votes organised by the United Nations.
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@antipodean someone asked him why he doesn't just allow and support union voting at Tesla sites... I don't think he bit on that one
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I don’t think Putin will use a nuc. He can kiss goodbye to his Black Sea fleet and so on if he does. I think he will try and keep Crimea at all costs and and the 2 rebel areas. But they seem a really terrible army.
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@Billy-Tell said in Ukraine:
I don’t think Putin will use a nuc. He can kiss goodbye to his Black Sea fleet and so on if he does. I think he will try and keep Crimea at all costs and and the 2 rebel areas. But they seem a really terrible army.
Threat of Russia is far bigger than capability of Russia. Without nukes they're basically a tinpot dictatorship.
The Russian military is about a month's pay away from total collapse.
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Interesting take from General David Petraeus - former head of the CIA.
Basically saying Putin has already lost militarily and if he uses a nuke or attacks a NATO country, he can kiss goodbye to his navy and his conventional forces in Ukraine, inc. Crimea
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@Victor-Meldrew I'm not saying he's wrong because the underlying premise that a nation can't use nuclear weapons without considerable consequence is one I agree with.
But it's hard to take anything seriously from a bloke with a gazillion medals who first "saw combat" as a major general.
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@antipodean said in Ukraine:
@Victor-Meldrew I'm not saying he's wrong because the underlying premise that a nation can't use nuclear weapons without considerable consequence is one I agree with.
But it's hard to take anything seriously from a bloke with a gazillion medals who first "saw combat" as a major general.
An awful lot of military had lots of medals but never actually see combat until later in their career - e.g. Admiral Sandy Woodard - but that doesn't mean they are poor officers or less worthwhile listening to.
He's a lot closer than we are, I guess, and you'd reckon he's pretty plugged in still I wonder if it's also a convenient way to issue a warning to Putin without it being official and still maintain a lot of ambiguity.