Interesting reads
-
-
<strong><a class="bbc_url" href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/aug/11/trotskyists-on-the-march-chaos-ahead">If the Trotskyists are on the march there’s chaos ahead</a></strong>
-
<p><a data-ipb='nomediaparse' href='http://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2016/08/slightly-more-than-100-exceptional-works-of-journalism/490622/'>http://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2016/08/slightly-more-than-100-exceptional-works-of-journalism/490622/</a></p>
<p> </p>
<p>Take your pick, Atlantic just did a series on 100 exceptional works of journalism</p>
<p> </p>
<p>I like this one -</p>
<p> </p>
<p><a data-ipb='nomediaparse' href='https://newhumanist.org.uk/articles/4892/what-would-you-see-on-a-journey-to-the-centre-of-the-earth'>https://newhumanist.org.uk/articles/4892/what-would-you-see-on-a-journey-to-the-centre-of-the-earth</a></p> -
<p style="color:rgb(40,40,40);font-family:helvetica, arial, sans-serif;">Great article about corupt cops in NYC in the 80s:</p>
<p style="color:rgb(40,40,40);font-family:helvetica, arial, sans-serif;"> </p>
<p style="color:rgb(40,40,40);font-family:helvetica, arial, sans-serif;"><a class="bbc_url" href="http://nymag.com/news/features/50431/" title="External link">http://nymag.com/news/features/50431/</a></p> -
<p>The words of one of Joseph Goebbel's secretaries</p>
<p> </p>
<p><a data-ipb='nomediaparse' href='http://www.stuff.co.nz/world/europe/83254136/brunhilde-pomsel-what-it-was-like-working-for-nazi-spin-doctor-joseph-goebbels'>http://www.stuff.co.nz/world/europe/83254136/brunhilde-pomsel-what-it-was-like-working-for-nazi-spin-doctor-joseph-goebbels</a></p> -
Psycho-active pharmaceuticals and tolerances:<br><br>
<a data-ipb='nomediaparse' href='http://slatestarcodex.com/2016/08/15/tolerance-troubles/'>http://slatestarcodex.com/2016/08/15/tolerance-troubles/</a> -
<div>
<blockquote class="ipsBlockquote">
<div><a data-ipb='nomediaparse' href='https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-08-22/mirror-trades-and-tax-tricks'><strong>Mirror Trades and Tax Tricks</strong></a></div>
<div> </div>
<div>11 AUG 22, 2016 8:24 AM EST</div>
<div>By Matt Levine</div>
<div> </div>
<div><strong>Deutsche mirrors.</strong></div>
<div> </div>
<div>I like a good scandal as much as anyone, but the Deutsche Bank mirror-trading scandal leaves me pretty blah. Some Russians had money in Russia, and they preferred to have it elsewhere. That seems understandable? So they bought some stocks in Russia, and sold the same stocks (from the accounts of related offshore entities) in London, usually running both legs through a Deutsche Bank trading desk. The result was that they had less money in Russia and more in London, although if you do the accounting it would seem that they’d also be building up a large stock position in Russia and an offsetting short position in London. I’m a little curious how they closed out their short positions in London. Did they, like, fly bags of stock certificates from Moscow? Doing the mirror trades solves the problem of moving cash from Moscow to London, but would seem to leave a residual problem of moving stock.</div>
<div> </div>
<div>The big new New Yorker article about the mirror-trading scandal doesn’t answer that admittedly odd question. Nor does it quite explain what laws were broken by the mirror trades; presumably they evaded Russian capital controls, and there is a strong suggestion that some of the mirror traders were oligarchs subject to U.S. sanctions, who could not have moved money in more straightforward ways. But for the other ones, it's hard to tell if this was regular banal tax avoidance -- analogous to the dividend-arbitrage strategy that is legal in a lot of places, though roundly disliked everywhere -- or something more nefarious. On the one hand, there's a certain baseline level of shadiness that is just expected from global banks in Russia. "If you wanted to be competitive, you had to do a lot of things that were not done in the developed world, because it was Russia," says a guy. On the other hand, the former head of Deutsche's Moscow equities desk, a 37-year-old American who is apparently living in Bali these days, is compared to both Jason Bourne and Edward Snowden, so perhaps he got up to something genuinely juicy. </div>
<div> </div>
<div>Meanwhile, the Russian broker who brought in the trades "wasn’t a great trader, but he was a good fisherman," which is exactly what you want in your broker.</div>
<div> </div>
<div><strong>Amazon taxes.</strong></div>
<div> </div>
<div>A core basic trick of international tax is:</div>
<div> </div>
<div>Build some intellectual property -- patents, technology, whatever.</div>
<div> </div>
<div>Put the IP in a subsidiary in a low-tax jurisdiction, say Luxembourg.</div>
<div> </div>
<div>Have all your subsidiaries in higher-tax jurisdiction pay the Luxembourg subsidiary a licensing fee for the IP.</div>
<div> </div>
<div>Make the licensing fee equal to your revenue.</div>
<div> </div>
<div>And by magic, you have moved all your taxable income from the high-tax jurisdictions where it is actually earned, to the low-tax jurisdiction where your IP sits. (The classic example is pharmaceuticals: If it costs you $1 to manufacture a pill that sells in the U.S. for $1,000, you have $999 in taxable income in the U.S. But if it costs you $1 to manufacture it, and you pay $998 in licensing fees to your Irish subsidiary, then you have only $1 in taxable income in the U.S., and $998 in Ireland, where hopefully your taxes are lower.) </div>
<div> </div>
<div>One problem with this trick is that step 2 -- "put the IP in a subsidiary in a low-tax jurisdiction" -- isn't quite as simple as I made it sound. You can't just "put" intellectual property somewhere. You have to sell it, or license it. So if you build the intellectual property in the U.S., and then move it to a subsidiary in Luxembourg, the Luxembourg subsidiary has to pay licensing fees right back to the U.S. one, eliminating the tax savings from the licensing payments that the high-tax subsidiaries are paying to the Luxembourg one. Unless of course those payments are different. If the U.S. company licenses the technology to the Luxembourg one for $1 a year, and then licenses it right back for $100 a year, it can still take a nice $99 tax deduction. But how could you justify that?</div>
<div> </div>
<div>Regulators in Europe and the U.S. say that the value Amazon places on the technology behind that experience varies radically depending on which side of the Atlantic it’s on -- and which appraisal will lower its tax bill.</div>
<div> </div>
<div>In Europe, the e-commerce giant tells authorities that the intellectual property behind its web shopping platform is immensely valuable, justifying the billions in tax-free revenue it has collected there since moving its technology assets to tax-friendly Luxembourg a decade ago. In the U.S., however, it plays down the value of those same assets to explain why it pays so little in taxes for licensing them.</div>
<div> </div>
<div>I mean, I'm sure it's all fine! (Amazon "said that the IP was perishable given the high failure rate of tech companies," and argued that U.S. authorities "had drastically underestimated the amount of research and development costs that should be attributed to" its Luxembourg subsidiary.) But do you kind of get why the Deutsche Bank mirror trades leave me cold? Like, moving money from one jurisdiction to another while minimizing taxes is just ... I don't want to say that it's the point of the international financial system, but it's a point of an international financial system, anyway. </div>
<p> </p>
</blockquote>
<p> </p>
</div> -
<p>The article that the movie War Dogs is based on:</p>
<p><a data-ipb='nomediaparse' href='http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/the-stoner-arms-dealers-20110316'>http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/the-stoner-arms-dealers-20110316</a></p> -
Someone Is Learning How to Take Down the Internet
Bruce Schneier, Tuesday, September 13, 2016, 10:00 AM
Over the past year or two, someone has been probing the defenses of the companies that run critical pieces of the Internet. These probes take the form of precisely calibrated attacks designed to determine exactly how well these companies can defend themselves, and what would be required to take them down. We don't know who is doing this, but it feels like a large a large nation state. China and Russia would be my first guesses.
First, a little background. If you want to take a network off the Internet, the easiest way to do it is with a distributed denial-of-service attack (DDoS). Like the name says, this is an attack designed to prevent legitimate users from getting to the site. There are subtleties, but basically it means blasting so much data at the site that it's overwhelmed. These attacks are not new: hackers do this to sites they don't like, and criminals have done it as a method of extortion. There is an entire industry, with an arsenal of technologies, devoted to DDoS defense. But largely it's a matter of bandwidth. If the attacker has a bigger fire hose of data than the defender has, the attacker wins.
Recently, some of the major companies that provide the basic infrastructure that makes the Internet work have seen an increase in DDoS attacks against them. Moreover, they have seen a certain profile of attacks. These attacks are significantly larger than the ones they're used to seeing. They last longer. They're more sophisticated. And they look like probing. One week, the attack would start at a particular level of attack and slowly ramp up before stopping. The next week, it would start at that higher point and continue. And so on, along those lines, as if the attacker were looking for the exact point of failure.
The attacks are also configured in such a way as to see what the company's total defenses are. There are many different ways to launch a DDoS attacks. The more attack vectors you employ simultaneously, the more different defenses the defender has to counter with. These companies are seeing more attacks using three or four different vectors. This means that the companies have to use everything they've got to defend themselves. They can't hold anything back. They're forced to demonstrate their defense capabilities for the attacker.
I am unable to give details, because these companies spoke with me under condition of anonymity. But this all is consistent with what Verisign is reporting. Verisign is the registrar for many popular top-level Internet domains, like .com and .net. If it goes down, there's a global blackout of all websites and e-mail addresses in the most common top-level domains. Every quarter, Verisign publishes a DDoS trends report. While its publication doesn't have the level of detail I heard from the companies I spoke with, the trends are the same: "in Q2 2016, attacks continued to become more frequent, persistent, and complex."
There's more. One company told me about a variety of probing attacks in addition to the DDoS attacks: testing the ability to manipulate Internet addresses and routes, seeing how long it takes the defenders to respond, and so on. Someone is extensively testing the core defensive capabilities of the companies that provide critical Internet services.
Who would do this? It doesn't seem like something an activist, criminal, or researcher would do. Profiling core infrastructure is common practice in espionage and intelligence gathering. It's not normal for companies to do that. Furthermore, the size and scale of these probes—and especially their persistence—points to state actors. It feels like a nation's military cybercommand trying to calibrate its weaponry in the case of cyberwar. It reminds me of the U.S.'s Cold War program of flying high-altitude planes over the Soviet Union to force their air-defense systems to turn on, to map their capabilities.
What can we do about this? Nothing, really. We don't know where the attacks come from. The data I see suggests China, an assessment shared by the people I spoke with. On the other hand, it's possible to disguise the country of origin for these sorts of attacks. The NSA, which has more surveillance in the Internet backbone than everyone else combined, probably has a better idea, but unless the U.S. decides to make an international incident over this, we won't see any attribution.
But this is happening. And people should know.
-
-
https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2016-goldman-sachs-libya/
Goldman Sachs & Mumar Gadaffi & how they lost $1.2b
-
-
"The Russians know better than anyone how weak the regime’s military really is. Earlier this year, a senior Russian official astonished a visiting American delegation by telling them that the Syrian army could field only 6,000 ‘capable and loyal’ troops for a big operation. Officially, the Syrian Arab Army is 125,000 strong.
‘The paper strength of the Syrian army is meaningless,’ said Tobias Schneider, a German military analyst who has done some of the best work on the regime’s forces. ‘The only thing … is how much money they pay a month to somebody. Offensives in this war are 1,000 people. Anybody who actually had the numbers they claim would be able to capture the whole of Syria.’"
That bit is fricking sureal.
-
@Tim I think the chilling bit was from McMullin towards the end "Russia isn't... able to project force in contest; they're able to project force when they're unopposed.... We're calling their bluff".
As did Napoleon. As did Hitler. You underestimate these fuckers at your peril history would tell us.
-
A novel method for removing material from search engines: