Ukraine
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This is a week or so old, but I found it really interesting as a Russian perspective
Russia’s elites are split over Vladimir Putin’s uncertain future
For 21 years, Putin was a highly convenient political leader for Russia’s ruling elites, preserving the status quo. But suddenly, he’s turned into a destroyer.
Tatiana Stanovaya
Sep 21, 2022 – 5.00amUkraine’s successful counterattack means that for the first time in Russian President Vladimir Putin’s 22 years in power, he has to deal with elites who disagree with him – on strategic decisions over Russia’s war in Ukraine and how the war may end.
Having launched the war not just without any internal discussions, but without even informing key players, Putin has taken huge risks politically. If the war were going well, that gamble would have paid off, but today, as Ukraine is counterattacking and Russia is retreating, questions about Putin’s decisions are mounting.
Support for Putin is wavering within the Russian elite amid questions over his handling of the war in Ukraine. AP
There are fears that Russia may lose outright. If the president fails to convince the elites that he remains a strong leader with a clear understanding of where he is taking the country, uncertainty may become a significant political risk to Putin’s regime.
It’s true that a portion of the Russian elites – the most powerful, ambitious, and dominating players – consider the war a disaster. But virtually everyone in the elite not only empathises with Putin’s political motives but also shares his understanding of the situation and motives in launching the war.
The political mainstream remains significantly anti-Western and anti-liberal, does not consider Ukraine a full-fledged state, and dreams of shaking up the world order as revenge for 30 years of Western arrogance.
Many believe that Russia was left with no other option but to do something disastrous that would destroy the current order and provide an opportunity to rebuild it in more historically just circumstances. To put this viewpoint simply: The war may be a disaster, but it is a justifiable and understandable one.
Consequently, in the first few weeks of the war in February and March, the elites consolidated around Putin. Even those who could be considered in-system liberals or technocrats – those who viewed Putin’s actions with dread and despair – displayed submission. Many put the blame for this geopolitical nightmare not on Putin but on the West.
Russia can’t lose. Or can it?
In the first stages, until April, many hoped that the war would end quickly – in, of course, a Russian victory, whether a peace deal with Ukraine or Ukraine’s outright defeat. Russia’s inevitable victory was questioned only in terms of its cost and duration. By the end of the northern hemisphere spring, the understanding that the conflict could drag on for years had become conventional wisdom: Russia can’t lose, simply because Ukraine can’t win.Or can it? A lot changed in September.
Ukraine’s unexpectedly successful counterattack, its first since the beginning of the war, has sparked serious concerns and fears among Russian elites. Namely, what if Russia can, in fact, lose? Importantly, these doubts are focused not so much on the capability of the Russian army or its military might (although that is also cause for concern), but, more importantly, on Putin and his ability to control the situation.
Concerns started to accumulate, with a growing number of questions going unanswered. Is Russia going to annex the occupied territory? Will it hold referendums on these areas becoming part of Russia, and if so, when? Which Ukrainian regions will it take? Is it capable of retaining them? Where will Moscow find personnel to serve in the public administrations? Will the Kremlin announce an official military mobilisation?
To this day, the questions keep coming, yet Putin has been silent. All he has said is that everything is going according to plan and “all the goals of the special operation will be achieved”; those were the only answers the elite apparently deserved to hear.
The Russian informational space, from opposition media to in–system outlets, has been awash with rumours, leaks, and assumptions apparently coming from the Kremlin. But nothing sounds convincing, and nothing has come true.
Putin, right, at the Shanghai Cooperation summit in Uzbekistan last week with from left: Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev. AP
Putin’s unwillingness to explain himself, to reveal practical plans and intentions, or to address concerns and fears is one of the main reasons that his leadership is being eroded. It’s one thing to put your fate in the hands of a political leader who is a proven strongman with the capacity to stand firm in the face of geopolitical challenges. It’s another thing entirely to find yourself completely dependent on a political leader who seems to be losing yet remains stubbornly reluctant to explain anything.
Putin failed to hold his annual address to the Federal Assembly, a joint meeting of both chambers of parliament, in the spring; postponed indefinitely his Direct Line (a Q&A show with ordinary Russians planned to be held over the summer); and dodges most subjects concerning the situation on the front. He started this war alone, and he is waging it alone, leaving the elites with no choice but to blindly follow and trust his shadow deliberations with a handful of nonpublic figures as isolated as the president himself.
Over the course of September, the long–running question of “How are we going to win this war?” became “How are we going to avoid losing this war?” The problem is that Putin’s initial concept – winning the war by militarily exhausting Ukraine, slowly biting off chunks of its territory, bombarding the rest of its territory, and just waiting until it gave up – stopped being remotely convincing when Ukraine launched its counterattack.
Putin has made just two public comments on the subject of a counterattack so far. In July, commenting on a possible Ukrainian counterattack, Putin said: “Let them try ... Everyone should know that, by and large, we have not started anything in earnest yet.”
And last week, he said that Russia’s “restrained response” to Ukrainian “terrorist attacks” would not last forever, adding: “Recently, Russian Armed Forces delivered a couple of sensitive blows to that area. Let’s call them warning shots. If the situation continues like that, our response will be more impactful.”
The nuclear option
These interventions shed no light on how Russia intends to avoid losing the war. Many now speculate that Russia may have only two options: a nuclear threat (to the West, or tactical use in Ukraine) or a general military mobilisation. The latter remains highly unlikely, while the former would spell world disaster.It would be wrong to assume that the ostensible Russian leadership knows about Putin’s plans and intentions. Anyone citing insiders or Kremlin leaks overlooks that these perspectives do not reflect Putin’s real views, only the suggestions of those who may be working around him. These insiders may only guess, divine, interpret, or rely on obsolete instructions.
A striking example is the Kremlin’s apparent preparations to hold referendums in occupied Ukraine. Summarising media leaks and talks with my own sources, it appears that at the end of August, the presidential administration was working on the basis of June assumptions that by September, Russia would have secured its control over major parts of the Luhansk and Donetsk regions – those that the Kremlin had recognised as independent entities on the eve of its invasion – and would therefore hold votes there.
In the first few days of September, it became painfully obvious that the political agenda was at odds with the military situation on the ground, and that the military agenda was significantly behind. All plans were paused at the last moment, several days before the envisaged referendum date (September 11).
The power vertical fails to act consistently: While domestic policy overseers, who are responsible for referendums, are ready to launch preparations for the votes, military divisions struggle to secure physical control over the territories, and the front line is moving. The FSB agency objected to the referendums over security concerns. Every official body has its own agenda and political priorities, which often contradict the goals of others or the overall goals of the military operation. Putin appears to be failing to bring it all together.
The military setbacks and ensuing uncertainty and fears that Russia may lose the war have also aggravated internal splits. The current challenging situation on the front has deepened the schism between two large groups: The first can be summarised as “let Putin do what he considers necessary,” and the second one as “it’s time to do something, since the Kremlin is failing to react appropriately”.
The first group consists of technocrats and senior officials in the presidential administration, the cabinet, and the central bank: They are all trying to focus on their supposedly peaceful agendas and can only watch the development of the military situation without being able to impact it.
Some seek political dividends (such as First Deputy Chief of Staff Sergey Kiriyenko), some (including Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin and central bank head Elvira Nabiullina) focus on their direct duties, ignoring the war atrocities. They are passive and diligent.
The second group, which may be frustrated into action, is much more visible and vociferous. It is made up of very different players, including those who are directly involved in military affairs (such as the armed forces, security services, national guard, Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov’s forces, and billionaire Yevgeny Prigozhin’s mercenaries), and the United Russia ruling party, the in-system opposition (Communists, Liberal Democrats, and A Just Russia-For Truth), and various public figures from the dominant conservative camp.
Uncertain future
All of them are either begging Putin to inflict a crushing defeat on the Ukrainian army as soon as possible or are preparing to act on their own initiative, such as the Chechen leader Kadyrov, who has called for self–mobilisation, or billionaire Prigozhin, who is recruiting prisoners to go and fight. This part of the elite is eager to propose their own political agendas to fill the vacuum that Putin is leaving on how Russia can win the war.Meanwhile, the setbacks caused an outcry among pro-war activists and bloggers. When Russia lost control over an important part of the Kharkiv region, social networks exploded with anguished cries that “Russia is losing,” “it’s a disaster,” and “where is Putin?” – as well as calls to investigate Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu and the General Staff for treason, and for an urgent full mobilisation.
This camp is strategically loyal and ideologically close to the authorities, and it does not have a significant political impact on the opinions of the populace. It has no structure or political organisation and appears to be harmless for the Kremlin. But in the current situation, this group has become extremely dangerous, as it may shape the mood among the elites, spread awareness about the reality of the situation, and fuel fears that Russia may lose. Panic can be highly contagious.
For 21 years, Putin was a highly convenient political leader for Russia’s ruling elites: His popularity guaranteed political stability and predictability, while his reluctance to carry out any reforms ensured the conservation of the status quo.
While his high approval rating still safeguards against political destabilisation from ordinary Russians, he has suddenly been transformed into a destroyer: a leader of a country with a very uncertain future.
But make no mistake. It’s not anti–Putin sentiment that has been rising. The current political demand is for a decisive, bold, well–informed, and competent strongman – and for Putin these latter two attributes are currently in doubt.
They want a leader who can guide, confront challenges, mobilise when needed, and give hope of a better future. The elites want the old Putin to return to his duties as a full-fledged political leader, connected to reality and his surroundings, but they don’t know if he still even exists.
There is no risk of an anti-Putin takeover, since there is still no alternative to him, and the elites remain hampered by their fear of the secret services and Putin’s omnipotence.
But growing uncertainty, nervousness, and fears that Russia could lose the war will push the elites to act more independently and more boldly against their enemies. Putin’s politically fading star is the biggest threat to the regime – much more dangerous than any possible opposition or mass protests.
Tatiana Stanovaya is a non-resident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the founder and CEO of political analysis firm R.Politik
— Foreign Policy
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I love the way you send a twitter thread and a video and you now know all Putins motives and want to educate us as to why he's not mad.
You love something you've fabricated in your head. Well done. My exact words were "I really think people should understand why Putin is doing what he's doing, and not just accept the he's a madman narrative." I read far too much MSM which just punches on the he's a madman, and never covers the actual reasons.
Jeez man, if that twitter thread actually nailed Putins thinking, then it very much makes him a madman.
That twitter thread is a translators translation of what he said in his own speech. I.e it's Putin's speech. As I said earlier I hadn't fact checked it. I've now read a lot more about it and almost all publications tie it to be the same. The difference is all the western media puts a "he's mad" slant on it. I found it interesting to read it from the source. I implore others to do the same as they may find the same.
I think Putin has massively fucked up. He's completely pinned his hopes to China, and a little bit of India. China could absolutely fuck Russia right now for a very long time. You call Europe piddly, but it hardly seems smart to me to put a trade sanction on them for the foreseeable future.
Where did I say it was smart? Europe population is small compared to these countries. And they are all issuing debt to cover their costs without his gas. Where does that lead? Thats an open question btw.
Putin has exposed his weak army for all to see. They're poorly trained and poorly managed. Unfortunately for all of us, they still have nukes.
Wars aren't going to be won by the on the ground army's. We all know that these days.
The only way I see out of this is if Putin is assassinated, ideally from within. Otherwise I think he just goes down swinging, and that's really bad for everyone.
Or a new world order. Neither seems like a win to me, but I'm part of the west, so I would wouldn't I ...
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@Victor-Meldrew said in Ukraine:
@MajorRage said in Ukraine:
I still think people are reading, and believing, far too much Western narrative.
I think the Western narrative is quite clear and believable. I don't see any serious discussion about Putin being overthrown anytime soon. The West wants the war to continue to drain Russia's economy, manpower, armed forces and isolate the country. It's a long-haul strategy.
Agree it's clear and believable. But is it going to end the way we all hope? Having read Putin's speech, I'm not so sure anymore.
Theres close to 150mill people in Russia. Around 200k have fled. Thats 0.125%. Certainly an exodus, but not exactly castrophic.
It's who's leaving though. These are the smart people the russian economy needs
I certainly hope so. But, I really don't know or can tell how much of the country has bought into his narrative.
We have very little feel for the support of the war there. Yes, there have been people protesting, but again, what percentage? Is it that high?
I'm watching mentions of public protests by soldier mothers. Growing, but slowly.
Good to hear.
The unknown thing for me is what sort of tie ups has he got with China & India, the worlds most populous country. You agree to supply gas to them, who gives a shit about Europe and it's piddly 750 mill people, of which a lot live in warmer climates.
China and India are wary and India is wary of China so that's one to watch.
Yet both seem happy to buy his gas ... long may they remain wary, but at this point in time, they are still funding his war.
That said, Putin now has 750 million people on his border who are much, much richer than he is, building up their armed forces, determined not to rely on his country for energy, pretty pissed off with him for invading Ukraine and eager to welcome that country into the EU.
Yep. But as I proposed on previous post about debt issuance ... for how much longer are they richer? Perhaps that is his long-game strategy.
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@MajorRage said in Ukraine:
Wars aren't going to be won by the on the ground army's. We all know that these days.
We do? Please explain what you mean by "won".
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@antipodean said in Ukraine:
@MajorRage said in Ukraine:
Wars aren't going to be won by the on the ground army's. We all know that these days.
We do? Please explain what you mean by "won".
Well, honestly there is no winner in war. Perhaps concluded is the better word.
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@MajorRage said in Ukraine:
@antipodean said in Ukraine:
@MajorRage said in Ukraine:
Wars aren't going to be won by the on the ground army's. We all know that these days.
We do? Please explain what you mean by "won".
Well, honestly there is no winner in war. Perhaps concluded is the better word.
Then in that case you're wrong. The army occupying the ground is the winner.
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@antipodean said in Ukraine:
@MajorRage said in Ukraine:
@antipodean said in Ukraine:
@MajorRage said in Ukraine:
Wars aren't going to be won by the on the ground army's. We all know that these days.
We do? Please explain what you mean by "won".
Well, honestly there is no winner in war. Perhaps concluded is the better word.
Then in that case you're wrong. The army occupying the ground is the winner.
EDIT: Not going to be driven away from the main point into this dribble.
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@MajorRage said in Ukraine:
@antipodean said in Ukraine:
@MajorRage said in Ukraine:
@antipodean said in Ukraine:
@MajorRage said in Ukraine:
Wars aren't going to be won by the on the ground army's. We all know that these days.
We do? Please explain what you mean by "won".
Well, honestly there is no winner in war. Perhaps concluded is the better word.
Then in that case you're wrong. The army occupying the ground is the winner.
EDIT: Not going to be driven away from the main point into this dribble.
Don't get pissy because you made an incorrect statement and got called on it.
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@MajorRage said in Ukraine:
Would recommend everybody reads this.
I’ve not fact checked any of it, but it’s a pretty interesting read
Same dude giving his interpretation:
Point (in the second tweet below) struck me:
Now that's a thread. I think I have a man-crush (on him, not you sorry)
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India and China aren't buying Russian gas (unless you mean gas in the American gasoline sense). Well, I think a small pipeline goes to china actually. But not connected to the huge infrastructure (and source) that supplies/ supplied Europe.
They are buying oil, though. Albeit at an opportunistic discount. Tankered.
India will never be connected to Russia by a pipeline . Geography precludes it.
China could, after a lot of new infrastructure is built.
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India and China aren't buying Russian gas (unless you mean gas in the American gasoline sense). Well, I think a small pipeline goes to china actually. But not connected to the huge infrastructure (and source) that supplies/ supplied Europe.
They are buying oil, though. Albeit at an opportunistic discount. Tankered.
India will never be connected to Russia by a pipeline . Geography precludes it.
Exactly. No common border means it would have to traverse Pakistan, so that won't happen. And there's no way you could build a pipeline into the Ladakh region - they have to rebuild the "highway" to Leh every year. This is how they get fuel up there:
China could, after a lot of new infrastructure is built.
The great irony being China wouldn't need it once it's built given the ticking time bomb that is their demographics.
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Speaking of demographics. Russia's population pyramid is pretty scary (for them) for people sub-30 years of age.
Really dont think they can afford the 60k deaths and counting of young men and now several hundred thousand crossing borders to avoid mobilization.
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@Rapido that is tight belt through the 15-24 brackets. Ages 5-14 is lean as well.
A fair whack of those men getting out of dodge will be 30+ with the means to live outside of Russian for a while, aka probably strong contributors to the economy.
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The Daily Telegraph channels Herman Kahn and makes the case for winning nuclear war.
The US government has estimated that Russia may have from 1000 to 2000 tactical nuclear warheads. Considering other Russian military equipment, it's likely that a lot of these are unserviceable. So this would not be the sort of operation that could be kept up forever: especially given reported shortages of suitable delivery systems to carry the warheads.
Look, they could probably only nuke Ukraine a few hundred times. Relax already!
Thank goodness for British nukes
What could Putin do then? Escalate again, as he and his spokesmen have threatened, and use strategic megaton-range nukes against Nato targets – London, for instance?
London would be a particularly bad choice. The UK, thank goodness, is a nuclear-armed nation and all of Russia would shortly cease to exist without the need for the rest of Nato to do anything. Russia's cities would not survive like Hiroshima and Nagasaki: strategic megaton weapons are a different ball game.
Check mate, Putin. Too bad about London, eh.
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@Tim It's an odd argument to make isn't it? We're all aware that the entire point of nuclear weapons is deterrence - having a leader threaten to use them in a conflict he started is a remarkable gambit.
IMO a better article in the WSJ:
Great and pertient quote of JFK: “Above all, while defending our own vital interests, nuclear powers must avert those confrontations which bring an adversary to a choice of either a humiliating retreat or a nuclear war.”
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The gung-ho vibe was truly weird, but the scenario of Putin using tactical nukes, it not having much of an impact on the battlefield and how the West would respond was quite plausible and seemed well thought thru - if a little terrifying.
Personally, I thunk Putin knows if he goes nuclear, he'll probably turn any friends he might have against him so will desist.